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As a matter of statute1 or common law,' and now as a matter of consti-
tutional law,' every death penalty jurisdiction forbids the execution of the
incompetent condemned." This doctrine, called "competency to be exe-
cuted," expresses a state policy of executing only those persons who un-
derstand that they are to be executed and why they are to be executed.5
1. Twenty-two states have enacted provisions proscribing the execution of the incompetent con-
demned. ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021 (1982); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-2622 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3700-3704 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101
(1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (Harrison 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-61 to -63 (1982); ILL
REV. STAT. ch. 38, 11005-2-3 (Smith-Hurd 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006 (1981); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 75(c) (Supp. 1985); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 62 (West Supp. 1986);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 552.060 (Vernon Supp. 1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-201 to -202 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 to -2538 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 176.425 to 455 (1986); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-4 to -14-7 (1978); N. Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 655-657 (Mckinney Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.28-30 (Page Supp. 1982);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1004-1058 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-13 (1982); Wyo. STAT. §
7-13-901 to -903 (Supp. 1977).
Other statutes provide for transfer of all mentally incompetent prisoners to the state hospital. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-4-1 to -4-5 (Burns 1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE §
19.2-177 (1983).
2. Four states have adopted, by case law, the common law rule prohibiting the execution of the
presently incompetent. State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 516, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (1943); Commonwealth v.
Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 22-23, 117 A.2d 96, 99-100 (1955); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 90-91, 135
S.W. 327, 329-30 (1911); State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641, 651 (1940) (dictum).
Idaho has a statute that provides for the adoption of the common law absent an explicit statutory
provision. IDAHO CODE § 73-116 (1973). Therefore, the common law rule against executing the
insane should apply.
3. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) (execution of insane violates Eighth Amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment).
4. The term "insane condemned" refers to inmates under sentence of death who become insane
prior to execution. The state in this instance is concerned with competency only at the time of the
execution; competency at the time of the crime or trial is assumed.
5. The rationale for the common law prohibition against executing an insane person is unclear. It
is clear, however, that the doctrine has been a part of the English common law since the medieval
period. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 530 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 2595 (1986).
Common law commentators have offered various explanations for the exemption. Blackstone, for
example, suggested that the state of insanity itself served as sufficient punishment. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *395-96. Lord Coke stated that the deterrent effect of execution would not be served
by execution of the insane, but instead would provide a "miserable spectacle . . . of extreame [sic]
inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others." COKE, THIRD INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed.
1680). Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General in the reign of King William III, argued that executing
insane criminals was inconsistent with principles of Christian charity because it deprived a man of his
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To effect this policy, the state requires the aid of the medical profession
both to evaluate the condemned when issues of competency arise, and to
treat the incompetent condemned for the purpose of restoring them to
competency.
The physician is bound by a fundamental ethical principle to do no
harm and to preserve life.6 Moreover, the physician is under an ethical
duty to heal the sick and prevent suffering.7 In competency to be executed
proceedings, the interest of the state in executing the condemned forces
these two principles of medical ethics into conflict.
Procedures that require physician participation but violate medical eth-
ics assume that the state interest in executing the condemned overrides
concern for the ethical integrity of the medical profession. The physician
cannot make an ethical choice. To comply with the interests of the state
by providing treatment, the physician must violate a fundamental ethical
prohibition, for without her treatment of the condemned, no execution
would take place. Yet by refusing to treat the patient and thereby avoiding
participation in the execution, the physician must forego her counter-
vailing ethical duty to heal the sick and prevent suffering. The physician's
dilemma is complicated when she is employed by the state and is therefore
subject to sanctions' for failure to comply with the treatment directive.
life before he could make his peace with God. Hawles, Remarks on the Tryal of Charles Bateman, in
11 STATE TRIALS *474, *477 (T. Howell ed. 1816). A final rationale rooted in the common law is
that an incompetent inmate is unable to assist his attorney in pursuing viable legal issues that may
still be present in his case. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *395-96 ("the law knows not
but he might have offered some reason, if in his senses, to have stayed these respective proceedings").
See also 1 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (1736) ("defendant might
allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution").
A modern understanding of the exemption is based on a theory of retribution. In one view, retribu-
tion is satisfied when a wrong is offset by a punitive act of the same quality; killing an insane person
does not have the same moral value or quality as killing a sane one. See Note, Insanity of the Con-
demned, 88 YALE L.J. 533, 536 (1979) (executing an insane prisoner would not satisfy retribution
because society wishes to take a life of equal value to the one taken).
Another expression of this rationale is that the prisoner is required to perceive the "expression of
society's moral outrage." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted). This goal is frustrated when the inmate is incompetent to comprehend the relationship be-
tween his conduct and the execution. See, e.g., Comment, Execution of Insane Persons, 23 So. CAL.
L. REV. 246, 256 (1950) ("[I]f punishment . . . is an act of vengeance, then the prisoner's ability to
appreciate his impending fate would seem to be the standard."); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial,
81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 458-59 (1967) (retribution frustrated when one against whom punishment is
inflicted cannot comprehend its significance). Indeed, according to one line of argument, retribution
does not simply extend to comprehension of punishment, but also requires an element of mental
suffering on the part of the condemned. See Radelet & Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determi-
nation of Competency To Be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 37, 39-40 (1986).
6. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing Hippocratic Oath).
7. For example, the code of ethics promulgated at the founding meeting of the American Medical
Association pledged physicians to: "minister to the sick with due impressions of the importance of
their office; reflecting that the ease, the health, and the lives of those committed to their charge,
depend on their skill, attention and fidelity." R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 25 (1981)
(quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS (1848)).
8. The state may exercise discretion over the employment, promotions, assignments, and salary of
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Part II of this Note will consider the extent to which Ford v. Wain-
wright9 and competency to be executed statutes require medical participa-
tion in the evaluation and treatment of the insane condemned. Part III
examines medical ethics with respect to the role of healer, and the duty to
do no harm and to take no life, and asserts that these two ethical strands
clash when the physician is called upon to treat pursuant to competency to
be executed statutes. Part IV analyzes the state interests in using the med-
ical profession to implement these statutes. Part V examines possible reso-
lutions to the ethical dilemma created by the state.
II. THE NECESSITY OF MEDICAL INVOLVEMENT
Although the rationale for the holding in Ford,'° as well as the states'
competency to be executed statutes, all emerged from the same common
law prohibition against executing the insane, the procedures chosen by the
various states to implement the prohibition vary. The Ford decision inval-
idated Florida's statute on the grounds of inadequate procedural due pro-
cess," but left unquestioned the necessity of psychiatric involvement. An
examination of the Florida statute, the Ford Court's analysis of the stat-
ute, and the implications of this analysis for all state competency to be
executed procedures, demonstrate that medical involvement is required to
allow the state to execute the insane condemned.
A. The Florida Statute
Florida relies heavily on psychiatric testimony to determine compe-
tency. 2 When the governor is informed that a condemned prisoner may
be insane, he must stay the execution pending evaluation by an appointed
commission of three psychiatrists.'3 These psychiatrists must determine
the physician.
9. 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
10. Id. at 2600 (Eighth Amendment "embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment
that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted").
11. Id. at 2604 ("[T]his most cursory form of procedural review fails to achieve even the minimal
degree of reliability required for the protection of any constitutional interest . . . .") (Marshall, J.,
plurality opinion). Justices Powell, O'Connor, and White also found the Florida procedures deficient.
Id. at 2609-10 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 2613 (opinion of O'Connor, J., White, J., concurring).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (Harrison 1982). Other statutes require only that a physician or
physicians be used. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (governor determines
competency based on medical exams); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (1972) (six physicians if possi-
ble). A small minority of states do not directly require medical involvement at this stage. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, T 1005-2-3 (1982) (court decides at hearing if condemned prisoner has proven
incompetency). However, because "[a] psychiatrist comes into the courtroom wearing a mantle of
expertise that inevitably enhances the credibility, and therefore the impact, of the testimony" a psychi-
atrist is the logical choice for an expert witness in such a hearing. Amicus Curiae Brief for the
American Psychiatric Association at 16, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) [hereinafter Barefoot
Amicus Brief].
13. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(1) (Harrison 1982).
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whether the prisoner "understands the nature and effect of the death pen-
alty and why it is to be imposed upon him."1 The governor, acting upon
this information, may then decide that the person has the requisite under-
standing and sign an order for execution.1 5 Alternatively, he may decide
that the condemned prisoner does not have the requisite understanding
and commit him to the State Hospital for the Insane."' At some time sub-
sequent to commitment, when the prisoner appears to have regained com-
petence, the governor appoints another commission of psychiatrists to de-
termine competency. 7 If the prisoner is found competent, the governor
signs a warrant directing execution.
B. The Ford Case
These procedures were challenged by counsel for Alvin Ford, an inmate
on Florida's death row, 8 who contended that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited the execution of the insane and guaranteed Ford greater proce-
dural due process protection than that accorded by the statute. Five mem-
bers of the Court held that the execution of the insane was proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment.19 In addition, two members of the Court, while
not subscribing to the constitutional analysis, agreed with the majority
that the Florida procedures were inadequate.20
14. Id.
15. Id. at § 922.07(2).
16. Id. at § 922.07(3). Most statutes require treatment in a state medical facility. See, e.g., ARmZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.4021-4024 (1978) (state hospital); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 62
(West Supp. 1985) (hospital at Massachusetts Correctional Institute, Bridgewater). A small minority
do not specify a medical facility. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.455 (1986) (confined in safe place
until reason restored).
17. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(4) (Harrison 1982).
18. Ford was convicted of murder in 1974 and sentenced to death. His sanity during the commis-
sion of the offense, at trial, or at sentencing was not an issue. He began to manifest bizarre changes in
his behavior in late 1981. See Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (describing Ford's delusions). Ford's
counsel subsequently engaged two psychiatrists to evaluate him. After both concluded that Ford suf-
fered from paranoid schizophrenia, see Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) at 2-3, Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986). Ford's counsel invoked the review proce-
dures of FLA. STAr. ANN. § 922.07.
19. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that "whether [the prohibition's]
aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect
the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds
enforcement in the Eighth Amendment." 106 S. Ct. at 2602. Justice Marshall also wrote an opinion,
joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, holding that the Florida procedures were inade-
quate and that Ford was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the United States District Court, de
novo, on the question of his competency to be executed. Id. at 2606.
20. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion, in which Justice White joined, agreeing that the hearing
afforded by the Florida statute was not consistent with due process requirements. However, Justice
O'Connor found that the statute created only a protected liberty interest, and did not rise to the level
of a constitutionally protected right. Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Because the hearing was a state created entitlement, due process imposed "few requirements"
and gave "broad latitude" to the state. Id. at 2612. Justice O'Connor concluded, nonetheless, that the
inmate was entitled to an opportunity to be heard, which the Florida statute denied. Id.
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The Court did not question the propriety of medical involvement in the
procedures. Rather, a majority recognized the inmate's interest in present-
ing medical evidence to dispute or support the state's findings on the issue
of sanity, highlighting "the value to be derived from a factfinder's consid-
eration of differing psychiatric opinions when resolving contested issues of
mental state."2 Thus, psychiatric participation remains of paramount im-
portance at the evaluation phase of the process.
Further, in all instances state statutes provide for execution following
restoration of competency by physicians.22 The Ford Court neither ques-
tioned this provision,2" nor specified any particular mental state that
would result in a finding of incompetence,24 leaving intact state defini-
tions. Inmates who meet the definition of incompetence in states such as
Florida often suffer from thought and affective disorders; 5 because these
disorders are properly treated by anti-psychotic medication,"6 physicians
must be involved to restore the inmates to competence.
C. Increasing Medical Involvement
The wretched living conditions, isolation, and unremitting terror of con-
templating one's execution promote the deterioration of mental function-
ing in vulnerable individuals that is likely to lead to a legal determination
of incompetence. Justice Frankfurter observed: "In the history of murder,
the onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a
rare phenomenon. '27
21. Id. at 2604 (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) (noting with approval Court's holding in Ake v.
Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985)). Justice Powell also criticized the Florida procedures as inviting
"arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected parties from offering contrary medical evidence."
Id. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
22. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (after prisoner is certified sane,
governor will fix new date for execution). Only Montana suggests any possibility of discretion. "If
. . . so much time has elapsed since the commitment of the defendant that it would be unjust to
proceed with execution of the sentence, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-19-202 (1985).
23. "[If] petitioner is cured of his disease, the State is free to execute him." 106 S. Ct. at 2610 n.5
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
24. Justice Powell asserted that the standard must forbid "the execution only of those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Id. at 2609.
25. For example, Gary Alvord, the only Florida inmate in recent history to be declared incompe-
tent to be executed, was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. Krasnow, Condemned by Reason of
Sanity, Times Union (Jacksonville, Fla.), Aug. 25, 1985, at A-1, col. 6.
26. For example, phenothiazines are used to treat such symptoms as hallucinations, psychotic
thought processes, bizarre responses, and paranoia. Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in THE COMPREHEN-
SIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2257-59 (1980). Lithium is the most effective treatment available
for manic-depressive disorders, acting on the "grandiosity. . . paranoid rages. . . and religious delu-
sions" typical of this disorder. Fieve, Lithium Therapy, in THE COMPREHNSiVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 2348 (1980). Federal prescription laws require that only licensed physicians may pre-
scribe medication for human consumption.
27. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The majority in
Solesbee sustained the constitutionality of GA. CODE § 27-2602, which provided that the governor,
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A death sentence and the grim quality of life on death row frequently
have been linked to stress and psychiatric illness. Several studies note the
psychological deterioration of condemned inmates.2" These studies relate
the mental illness not only to the conditions on death row, but also to the
unique stress of anticipating one's death at a known time and in a
predesignated manner.29 Similarly, detailed profiles of individual inmates
document overwhelming stress and dehumanization. 30
The situation caused by this environment, which fosters mental deterio-
ration, is aggravated by the current judicial tilt towards capital punish-
ment. The population on death row, estimated at 1,500 inmates, continues
to grow.31 Many inmates have been residents of death row for substantial
periods of time." The pace and complexity of the present death penalty
process guarantees a long wait between sentence and execution. 3 Clearly,
post-sentencing incompetence will become more common. Therefore, doc-
tors can anticipate that the state will require their services more fre-
assisted by medical reports, could determine sanity following conviction of a capital offense, even
though the decision could not be appealed and there was no adversary hearing.
28. See, e.g., Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution,
119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962). In their study of death row inmates at Sing Sing, the authors
detailed various symptoms and psychological defense mechanisms displayed by the inmates. For exam-
ple, the authors noted that one prisoner had become "progressively more suspicious and grandiose
during his death house stay." Id. at 394. See also Gallemore & Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy
Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167 (1972) (detailing psychiatric deterioration of
individuals confined to death row in North Carolina for over two years). A study of death row in
Alabama confirmed findings of psychological despair and thoughts of suicide among death row in-
mates, and found that normal psychological defense mechanisms do not suffice to manage the stress.
R. JOHNSON, CONDEMNED To DIE: UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH Ill (1981).
29. Bluestone & MeGahee, supra note 28, at 393; Gallemore & Panton, supra note 28, at 167.
30. In C. DAVIS, WAITING FOR IT (1980), a study of condemned inmate Troy Gregg on death
row in Georgia, the author notes that in "dealing with the threat of their imminent extinction...
[t]hose with natural balance and strength of mind survive more or less intact until they are killed. The
rest fail visibly from month to month and are destroyed in effect before the state can do its work." Id.
at 157. See also S. GETTINGER, SENTENCED To DIE 93 (1979) (collection of eight case histories of
murderers on death row, concluding that central truth of life on death row is "the intense psychologi-
cal stress"). Gettinger quotes a study by Dr. Louis J. West, a psychiatrist who described death row as
a "grisly laboratory . . . the ultimate experimental stress, in which the condemned prisoner's person-
ality is incredibly brutalized." Id. at 94. See also B. JACKSON & D. CHRISTIAN, DEATH Row 11
(1980) (life on death row in Texas depicted as "a world of enormous sensory overload and sensory
deprivation").
31. 20 Psychiatric News, Dec. 6, 1985, at 14, col. 3. At the end of 1984, the Department of
Justice reported that 1,405 people were on death row in the United States. See Bureau of Just.
Statistics Bull., Aug. 1985, at 5.
32. In 1984, the median time on death row was 33 months. Bureau of Just. Statistics Bull., Aug.
1985, at 1. By comparison, in 1983 the median time on death row was only 28 months, although
almost 3 out of 10 inmates had been on death row at least 4 years, including 143 persons who had
been waiting to be executed for 6 or more years. Bureau of Just. Statistics Bull., July 1984, at 3-4.
33. Richard Burr, the attorney for condemned inmate Alvin Ford, remarked that "competence at
the time of execution is an issue that the modern criminal justice system has made worse. People are
in virtual solitary confinement on death row for many years as the lengthy but necessary review of
their sentence unfolds." 13 Clinical Psychiatry News, Apr. 1985, at 25, col. 4.
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quently to provide evaluations and treatment pursuant to competency to
be executed statutes.
III. MEDICAL ETHICS AND COMPETENCY To BE EXECUTED
A. The Oath and Ethical Codes
If the psychiatrist in a competency to be executed proceeding were
functioning solely as an autonomous person, the propriety of participation
would be based on individual morality and ethics. However, the psychia-
trist's involvement is premised on her status as a licensed member of the
profession. By virtue of her membership, the psychiatrist must observe
explicit ethical principles of the profession. 4 Arguably, a fully competent
physician must be an ethical physician. 3
5
The Hippocratic Oath is a primary source of medical ethics which de-
fines the role of healer, requiring respect for the patient and imposing a
duty to do no harm and take no life."6 It has "come down through history
34. In medical practice, ethics are not merely good manners or etiquette. One commentator de-
scribes the relationship between ethics and medical practice:
Both medicine and law are properly called "learned and ethical professions". . . . The term
"profession" or "ethical profession" is used because the qualified physician or attorney must in
fact profess a specific set of normative or ethical committments. Thus, to be "learned" is to be
the master of special knowledge and technique; to be of the "profession" is to be committed to
using that knowledge and technique in the service of certain fundamental values. . . . In
medicine, the ultimate such value is life-or, more fully, the protection, preservation, and
(when possible) improvement of life and health. To be indifferent to health or sickness, to life
or death, is to have abandoned medicine as an ethical profession.
Derr, Why Food and Fluids Can Never Be Denied, 16 Hastings Center Rep. 28, 29 (Feb. 1986).
The decision to impose sanctions is not the only indication of an ethical breach. However, for APA
members, violation of these ethical principles will result in the imposition of various sanctions, rang-
ing from reprimand to expulsion from the organization. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY
10 (1985) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. Under certain circumstances, information regarding the ethical
breach will be disclosed to "any medical licensing authority, medical society, hospital, clinic, or other
institutions or persons where such disclosure is deemed appropriate to protect the public." Id. at 15
(quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION BYLAWS ch. 10, §§ 1, 2).
35. The section of the PRINCIPLES concerning provision of "competent medical service" is defined
by the APA to refer to the psychiatrist's ethics and professional responsibility. PRINCIPLES, supra note
34, at § 1(1) (emphasis added). Further, "[tihe medical and nursing professions are consecrated to
preserving life. That is their professional creed. To them, a failure to use a simple, established proce-
dure in the circumstances. . . would be malpractice, however the law may characterize that failure."
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 582, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (1971) (blood
transfusion justified by interest of hospital and its staff, as well as state's interest in life).
The proposition that ethical conduct is a component of professional competence has also been ac-
knowledged in the legal profession: "[Albiding by the codes of professional conduct applicable to one's
profession is an attribute of professional competence as well as evidence of trustworthiness." Leleiko,
Professional Responsibility and Public Policy Formation, 49 ALB. L. REV., 403, 412 (1985) (refer-
ring to lawyers who function within the area of policymaking).
36. The Hippocratic Oath probably dates from the fourth century B.C. R. VEATCH, supra note
7, at 19-20 (citing L. EDELSTEIN, ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN
55 (1967)). Versions of the Oath may be found in such publications as BRIT. MED. ASS'N, THE
HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL ETHICS 63-64 (1981); PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 343-44 app. (S. Bloch & P.
Chodoff eds. 1981); W. OSLER, THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN MEDICINE 63-64 (1921). The Oath
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as a living statement of ideals to be cherished by the physician,' 37 and is
"the central document, the single most often-cited summary of the physi-
cian's own understanding of what is morally required to be a good medi-
cal doctor.""8 The significance of the Oath is so considerable that medical
students are taught: "From the point of view of the patient-doctor rela-
tionship the most important rule in practice is the classical non nocere [do
no harm] demand, already formulated by Hippocrates." 9
Those outside the medical profession also view the Oath as central to
the practice of medicine. One commentator remarked that the Oath's
"spirit influences much of health care and it is frequently invoked as nor-
mative by the layman."'40 The significant point is that both physicians and
the society in which they work view the Oath as a distillation of medical
ethics, as well as a legitimate standard of evaluation for medical
performance.
In addition to the Oath, physicians have promulgated various codes of
ethics. The World Medical Association has written a modern restatement
of the Oath, namely, the Declaration of Geneva. 1 It emphasizes the role
of healer: "[T]he health of my patient will be my first consideration.' 42
Similarly, the Declaration of Hawaii, adopted by the World Psychiatric
Association, states that "[tihe aim of psychiatry is to promote health and
states: "I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider
for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no
deadly medicine to anyone if asked. Into whatsoever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit
of the sick." OSLER, id. at 64. A somewhat different translation reads: "I will apply . . . measures for
the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgement; I will keep them from harm and injus-
tice." PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS, supra, at 343. A Christian version is found in Chambers, Ethics or
Medical Ethics, 24 MED. Sci. L. 17, 18 (1984).
37. Preface, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMA vii (1982). The
Judicial Council publishes Rules of the Judicial Council to inform its membership of medical ethics.
38. R. VEATCH, supra note 7, at 18-19. Veatch asserts that the code is binding only on those
parties who have agreed to it; that is, the members of the medical profession. As such, he feels that the
Oath is of little relevance to the resolution of questions of medical ethics when the interests of society,
which is not a party to the Oath, are involved. The public regularly demonstrates a different interpre-
tation, see supra note 34 and accompanying text, as does the judiciary, which refers to the Oath when
considering issues that involve the relationship between the medical profession and patients. See, e.g.,
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("Almost
every member of the public is aware of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic Oath,
and every patient has a right to rely upon the warranty of silence."); Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App.
718, 725, 415 A.2d 625, 630 (1980) (doctor's obligations to patients defined by Hippocratic Oath).
39. V. TAHKX, THE PATIENT-DOCTOR RELATIONSHIP 38 (1984). Because this source is a text-
book, it may be understood to distill the essence of what one generation of doctors desires to pass on to
the next.
40. Chambers, Ethics or Medical Ethics, 24 MED. Sci. L. 17, 18 (1984) (citing V. NuTTON,
DICTIONARY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (Dunstan ed. 1981)); see also supra notes 34, 36 (describing
public expectation that physicians will abide by Oath).
41. PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS, supra note 36, at 344 (Declaration, adopted in 1948 and amended in
1968, included).
42. Id.
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personal autonomy and growth. . . . Every patient must be offered the
best therapy available." 4
These codes reflect the tradition of doing no harm to the patient. As
applied to executions, the House of Delegates of the American Medical
Association (AMA) has expressed this precept in its statement that a
"physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when
there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally author-
ized execution."44 Also, psychiatrists who are members of the American
Psychiatric Association (APA)45 are bound by the AMA ethical guidelines
as annotated for psychiatrists, which state that while it is appropriate for
psychiatrists to serve as consultants to the judiciary, 6 "[a] psychiatrist
should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution."47
The Hippocratic Oath and the codes of ethics suggest that the duty to
treat and comfort the sick is integral to the role of being a physician.
Consequently, the physician who encounters a condemned patient who is
mentally ill will wish to treat the individual,4 8 yet also to do no harm to
the patient by restoring the requisite competency for execution.
B. The Ethical Conflict
Medical ethics may be implicated whenever psychiatric participation in
capital proceedings is required. Psychiatrists have long been involved in
assessing competency to stand trial,4" predicting future dangerousness, 50
43. Id. at 350 (adopted in Honolulu in 1977).
44. Capital Punishment, PRoc. HOUSE DELEGATES AMA 85, 86 (1980). Controversy within the
profession about this provision reflects uncertainty as to the meaning of the term "participate." The
National Medical Association Section on Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, an organization of mi-
nority physicians, holds that doctors should treat the condemned mentally ill, but "under no circum-
stances directly or indirectly assist in an execution of a 'death row' inmate." National Medical Associ-
ation Section on Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, Position Statement on the Role of the
Psychiatrist in Evaluating and Treating Death Row Inmates, at 5 [hereinafter NMA Position Paper].
In contrast, the Florida Mental Health Association found the involvement sufficiently unethical that it
urged all mental health professionals to boycott determinations of competence to be executed. See
Proposed Public Policy Position Regarding Mental Capacity To Be Executed of the Florida Mental
Health Association (1984) [hereinafter FMHA Policy Statement.
45. Approximately 32,000 of the 40,000 psychiatrists practicing in the United States are members
of APA. Motion for Leave To File Brief Amicus Curiae for the APA, Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct.
2595 (1986).
46. PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at § 7(1).
47. Id. at § 1(4). The proscription is binding on members of the APA through ch. 8, § 1 of the
APA bylaws. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at § 7(1).
48. A physician is, of course, not bound to treat every patient she encounters. However, this
discretion is usually limited to non-emergency situations in which another physician is available to
meet this person's needs. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at § 6 ("A physician shall . . . except in
emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve.").
49. For a modern statute requiring psychiatric involvement in these proceedings, see the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1983) (psychiatrist required for assisting in determi-
nation of incompetency).
50. This role is prescribed in capital sentencing by statutes that require the jury to determine
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
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and determining competency to waive appeal."1 Medical ethics in these
proceedings are often examined in the context of the forensic psychia-
trist,52 who may owe "dual allegiances" to the state and the profession,
thus creating considerable concern that the medical well-being of a patient
is subordinate to duties to the employer.3 Any psychiatric participation in
capital proceedings arguably raises the ethical duty of the physician not to
take life. However, total physician abstention from these proceedings may
adversely affect the exercise of individual rights associated with the crimi-
nal justice process. For example, the constitutional right to a fair trial
requires that a person be competent to stand trial.5 4 Were psychiatrists to
refuse to make competency determinations at capital proceedings, a consti-
tutional right of the defendant would be imperiled. Further, physician re-
sponsibility at this stage of the criminal process for an inmate's execution
is quite attenuated. The accused still enjoys the presumption of innocence;
he may plead guilty to avoid the death penalty; and even if the accused is
convicted, the jury may choose not to impose a death sentence, or the
judge may direct that the sentence not be imposed. In competency to waive
appeal proceedings, the inmate may be making a conscious choice to
forego potentially life-sparing action, analogous to the situation where a
physician respects a competent patient's right to die.55
The ethical question which this Note identifies, therefore, focuses on
psychiatric involvement in competency to be executed proceedings. Some
psychiatrists assert that the initial evaluation of an inmate for competency
constitute a continuing threat to society. See TEX. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981). The use of
psychiatrists becomes both desirable and necessary from the point of view of the prosecution and the
defense. Cf Barefoot Amicus Brief, supra note 12 (criticizing the role of psychiatrists in these
proceedings).
51. See, e.g., Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam) (judicial determination of inmate's
mental competence to refuse assistance of counsel and terminate legal proceedings required); see also
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 nn.4-5 (1976) (defendant made "knowing and intelligent
waiver" of federal rights after death sentence imposed).
52. Forensic psychiatrists use psychiatric principles and techniques to enable courts to arrive at
legal determinations.
53. In the traditional doctor-patient relationship, the physician obtains confidential information
from the patient for therapeutic purposes. In contrast, the forensic psychiatrist routinely gathers infor-
mation for non-therapeutic purposes for the benefit of third-party employers. For this reason, among
others, the practice of forensic psychiatry has provoked considerable debate about appropriate medical
ethics and roles. See, e.g., J. RoBrrsCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1980); Bazelon, The Law,
the Psychiatrist, and the Patient, 5 MAN & MED. 77, 81 (1980) ("The question of divided loyalties is
of direct relevance when psychiatrists are called upon, as they are continually, to make important
decisions in a legal setting."); Rappeport, Ethics and Forensic Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS
255 (forensic psychiatry still a relatively new science, hence ethics yet to fully develop). See generally
T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965) (asserting that psychiatrists must never use their professional
tools to assist the law).
54. Cf. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
55. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See gener-
ally Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1975) (analyzing right to die cases).
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implicates the taking of life and is thus prohibited.5" However, in per-
forming an evaluation, the role of the physician as a healer is not necessa-
rily implicated. "[T]o pretend that the usual doctor-patient role is in effect
during a forensic examination is patently dishonest and unethical. 57 Not-
withstanding the psychiatrist's proximity to the execution process, if she
properly informs the inmate of the purpose of evaluation and the lack of
confidentiality, her function is that of a court consultant, which is ethically
permissible. 58 Further, refusing to evaluate may lead to death,59 while a
diagnosis of incompetency presents the life-affirming possibility of a stay
of execution. The inmate is under a sentence of death, which the psychia-
trist can either affirm, in which case nothing has changed, or delay
through a finding of incompetency, preserving an inmate's life.00
However, the ethical implications change in the treatment phase of
competency to be executed proceedings. This Note proposes that in the
treatment phase, the moral culpability of the physician is so clear and
direct that it is justifiable to draw a line and recognize the physician's
ethical objections. An analogy can be made to the doctrine of causality in
the criminal law with regard to homicide. This doctrine is expressed in
the Model Penal Code § 2.03 (1985), which states: "Conduct is the cause
of a result when: (a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in ques-
tion would not have occurred . ... " Murder is defined as "purposely
or knowingly" causing the death of another human being."2 In turn, this
intent requirement is satisfied when death was within the purpose or the
contemplation of the actor.
The proximity of the psychiatrist's actions to execution is such that but
for the physician's conduct, the inmate would not die. The inmate is
under a stay of execution that expires upon the restoration of sanity.
Thus, the act of treatment and restoration of sanity is the only condition
precedent for the execution of the individual. This result is in the contem-
plation of the physician because the patient is explicitly referred to the
56. Dr. Paul Applebaum, chairman of the Judicial Council of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's Commission on Judicial Action, asserted that "psychiatrists really as physicians, as healers,
have no place anywhere near these determinations." Nightline: Catch 22: Curing Prisoners. . . To
Die (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Nightline] (statement of Dr. Paul Apple-
baum, appearing in his individual, not official, capacity).
57. Rappeport, supra note 53, at 263.
58. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at § 4(6) ("Psychiatrists are often asked to examine individu-
als . . . to determine legal competence. The psychiatrist must fully describe the nature and purpose
and lack of confidentiality of the examination to the examinee at the beginning of the examination.");
Rappeport, supra note 53,at 262 ("It is imperative that the patient be informed clearly whose servant
the interviewer is.").
59. Absent a finding of incompetency, the inmate will be executed.
60. See Radelet & Barnard, supra note 5, at 49-50.
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1985).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, 210.2 (1985).
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physician for treatment pursuant to the statute. Thus, the physician
knows that successful treatment renews the inmate's death warrant, and
the causation is proximate. But for state exoneration of her action, similar
to the privilege accorded soldiers in battle, the physician is taking life in
violation of her ethics. This exemption may insulate the physician from
legal liability, but in no way diminishes the ethical violation.
This procedure is particularly egregious for the physician because she
cannot fulfill her ethical role of healer by treating the sick and preventing
suffering."3 In a bizarre twist of the medical treatment situation, the ex-
press purpose of competency treatment is to guarantee that the patient
will be killed. 4 Each treatment strategy to heal the inmate is in fact an-
other strategy to ensure his death. No intervening acts save the miniscule
likelihood that, once sane, the inmate will articulate a heretofore unknown
reason for a stay of execution,6 will prevent the execution that the physi-
cian has made possible.
The present ethical dilemma is, in part, a result of the modern psychia-
trist's ability to treat successfully the mentally ill. Doctors have had effec-
tive drugs to control psychotic symptoms for only the past thirty years. 6
Historically, treatment for psychosis was at best custodial, and at worst
harmful; hence, an insane person rarely regained his sanity. 7 The exemp-
63. Despite serious misgivings about the involvement of psychiatrists in incompetency to be exe-
cuted proceedings, one medical group stated that it could "not advise psychiatrists to refuse to evaluate
and treat patients who are unfit for execution as this would constitute a failure to perform a psychia-
trist's duty, i.e. to provide evaluation and treatment to the mentally ill." NMA Position Paper, supra
note 44, at 2-3.
64. On its face, the purpose of treatment is to cure the patient, and the consequence of the cure is
to enable the state to execute. However, because the execution is in the contemplation of the psychia-
trist when she commences treatment, the distinction is meaningless. See supra notes 61-62 and accom-
panying text (discussing Model Penal Code definition of culpability).
65. See Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d at 528, rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986). Dr. Radelet noted
that the only case he had found supporting the common law rationale was a case in which a man was
sentenced to death, found incompetent, and confined to a mental hospital for thirty years. He was
then found innocent of his crime. Nightline, supra note 56, at 4.
66. See S. ALEXANDER & F. SELESNICK, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY 287-91 (1966) (tracing
the development of psychotropic drugs); Klerman & Schechter, Ethical Aspects of Drug Treatment, in
PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS, supra note 36, at 117-18 (describing "modern revolution" created in mental
health care through development and use of psychotropic drugs in late 1950's).
Chlorpromazine and other anti-psychotic drugs have been tested in hundreds of double-blind stud-
ies. In a typical study conducted by the National Institute of Mental Health, about 70% of the pa-
tients improved significantly with phenothiazine therapy, while one-tenth showed no improvement
and none showed deterioration. In contrast, one-fourth of the placebo group showed moderate to
marked improvement and almost half remained unchanged or became worse. Davis, Organic Thera-
pies, in THE COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2257-58 (1980).
67. Seventeenth-century Europeans, for example, tended to view mental illness as a manifestation
of demonic possession and treated the disorder with the scourge, the rack, the stake and the gallows.
A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 24-25 (1937). By the eighteenth century, treatment,
when administered, often consisted of "emetics, purgatives, bloodletting and various so-called harmless
tortures provided by special paraphernelia." F. ALEXANDER & S. SELESNICK, supra note 66, at 114.
The neglect and poor treatment attendant on such views of mental illness killed many patients. Id. at
116. Psychoanalysis was a significant therapy in the early twentieth century, but Freud himself con-
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tion thus effectively functioned as a reprieve. It is reasonable to assume
that medical advances will continue to provide more effective means for
treating the mentally ill. This trend, coupled with predictions of increas-
ing numbers of incompetent condemned inmates on death row, makes the
ethical conflict centered on treating the condemned a very serious problem
for physicians and society.
C. A Case Study in Florida
A recent case in Florida demonstrates the intensity of the ethical di-
lemma. Pursuant to the statutory process,68 Gary Eldon Alvord, convicted
killer of three Tampa women, was examined by a panel of three psychia-
trists and found incompetent to be executed. 9 Alvord was subsequently
committed to the Chattahoochee State Hospital for the purpose of being
restored to competency so that he might be executed.70
Response to Alvord's presence at the hospital was immediate. The Flor-
ida Mental Health Association (FMHA) issued a proposal that attempted
to address both the duty to alleviate suffering and the duty to avoid partic-
ipation in an execution. The result was a statement with contradictory
provisions. 71 The Human Rights Advocacy Committee of the hospital
raised questions pertaining to the participation of staff members in restor-
ing competency, and endorsed the FMHA position . 2 The committee rec-
ommended that before hospital staff be required to treat the incompetent
ceded that it was of small utility in the treatment of psychotic symptoms. A. NORTON, THE NEW
DIMENSIONS OF MEDICINE 140-141 (1969).
Statistics on rates of cure with these old forms of treatment are sparse, and are generally viewed as
unreliable because of distortions in the manner of compiling and reporting. One study cites a recovery
figure of about 15% in 1937, A. DEUTSCH, supra, at 148, and it is unlikely that the primitive treat-
ments used prior to this time raised that figure substantially. See id. at 147-57 (criticizing earlier
emphasis on cure rates). In contrast, the literature of the late 1960's was already referring to "the ease
and speed with which many psychotic illnesses can be treated today." A. NORTON, supra, at 144.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (Harrison 1982).
69. Two of the psychiatrists, Peter Ivory and Gilbert Ferris, were state employees working at the
Chattahoochee State Hospital, while the third, Umesh Mhatre, was not a state employee. Miller &
Walker, Alvord 'Incompetent'; Sent to Chattahoochee, Tampa Tribune (Fla.), Nov. 27, 1984, at 1B,
col. 3, 2B, col. 2.
70. Alvord resides in the new Corrections Mental Health Institution on the hospital grounds,
which is jointly operated by the state health agency and the state corrections department. Krasnow,
supra note 25, at A-1, col. 6.
71. The Association opposed the "appointment of government psychiatrists to determine mental
capacity to be executed, endorsed increasing the provision of mental health services to death row
inmates, [and] opposed the involuntary treatment of those who are incompetent to be executed."
FMHA Policy Statement, supra note 44.
72. Peter Ostreich, chairman of the committee, observed, "[m]ental-health treatment is supposed
to be provided for the benefit of the patient. . . . This treatment is not going to be of any benefit to
him." Leonard, Death Row Inmate's Treatment Sparks Controversy, Tallahassee Democrat (Fla.),
Dec. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
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condemned, the sentence be commuted to life imprisonment;73 staff treat-
ment thus would not advance the patient toward execution.7 4
IV. THE STATE INTEREST
The state interest in utilizing physicians both for their professional skills
and the humane appearance their presence brings to the proceedings is in
tension with competing state values in protecting the integrity of the medi-
cal profession-and the public's perception of the medical role-from
identification with the spectre of the executioner.
A. Arguments Favoring Use of Physicians
When the state makes the somber and serious decisions to enact a death
penalty statute and to sentence a particular person to death, the state
clearly has an interest in executing that person. 5 Nevertheless, the state is
prohibited from executing the insane condemned, 6 and hence may never
exercise the power to execute if the inmate is permanently insane. Cir-
cumstances, therefore, do exist that override the state interest in execution.
Justice Frankfurter wrote that, "[t]he risk of an undue delay is hardly
comparable to the grim risk of the barbarous execution of an insane
man."7
Clearly, the state retains an interest in ensuring that competent prison-
ers do not frustrate, with false pretensions of incompetency, the state's
ability to carry out an execution. The Court has expressed concern that
"it would be wholly at the will of a convict to suffer any punishment
whatever, for the necessity of his doing so would depend solely upon his
fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be followed
by trial upon trial."7 8 To address this concern, the State may request that
73. Id. at Al, col. 2.
74. Alvord was treated at the State Hospital by a volunteer staff. Krasnow, supra note 25, at A-
13, col. 1. Staff at the Corrections Mental Health Institution where Ford was transferred were given
the choice of "opting out" of participation in treatment of Alvord. Id. at col. 2. Dr. Loren Roth,
director of the APA Council on Law and Psychiatry stated: "We certainly recognize the troublesome
and anomalous position the staff at the hospital is being put in." Id. at col. 1. Dr. Roth also stated
that there is no easy answer to the dilemma of whether to treat death row inmates for psychiatric
disorders. "Certainly medicine is devoted to the relief of suffering wherever that may be . . . . These
people are sick and they are suffering." Id.
75. This is true only if one accepts that the death penalty is a legitimate exercise of state author-
ity; the Supreme Court has found it to be so. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
76. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
77. Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-406 (1897) (holding due process clause does not guar-
antee condemned prisoner right to jury trial on issue of present competency). Among the solutions
proposed to address this possibility are relying on a "probable cause" requirement for granting a stay
of execution, see Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32
STAN. L. REV. 765, 803 (1980), and restricting condemned inmates to one full hearing on an insanity
claim, with future proceedings on subsequent claims expedited. See Note, Insanity of the Condemned,
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physicians evaluate those condemned inmates whose competency is in
question. Employing a physician to screen out such frivolous claims, how-
ever, does not bring the ethical conflict to the fore, because it only impli-
cates the physician's role as evaluator and consultant to the court.7 9
Another justification for the use of physicians is to implement the stat-
ute in a manner that is fair, scientific, and reliable.80 The physician's ex-
pertise increases the probability that treatment decisions will be accurate
and effective, enabling the state to proceed with the execution. Also, the
profession's integrity is superimposed on the proceedings, sanitizing the
execution and lending an aura of propriety and humaneness. But treat-
ment in this context is in the best interest of the state, not the best interest
of the patient, who will die if treatment succeeds."1 The state is asking the
physician to treat an unwilling individual" in order to change him to
meet the will of society , which is especially repugnant to medical ethics.8 3
supra note 5, at 563. The state's interest in preventing inappropriate delay of execution is complicated
by the fact that the inquiry addresses competency at the moment of execution. Obviously, competency
cannot be determined at the moment of execution; consequently, the prisoner is able to raise repeated
claims up to the actual moment of execution. See Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the
Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REv. 381, 400 (1962).
79. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
80. Because of their specialized knowledge and the vulnerability of their patients, members of the
medical profession have traditionally been regarded by the public as particularly trustworthy and
responsible. See, e.g., Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 797 (public has right to rely on medical code of
ethics); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (App. Div. 1982) (relationship of parties one
of "trust and confidence" which is "essential to the doctor-patient relationship"). The psychiatrist
provides an aura of certainty, wearing a mantle of expertise that lends credibility to the process. See
Barefoot Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 9, 16.
Critics of the use of physicians in capital proceedings attribute different motives to the state. One
critic of physician participation in lethal injections notes that the true appeal of using physicians is not
that the prisoner feels less pain, but that a medical veneer is superimposed on the act. The veneer
creates a "'false image about an act which is quite final and quite dehumanizing,'" because the
injection is given by health professionals, who are considered to have the "'highest developed quality
of love for humanity.'" Malone, Death Row and the Medical Model, 19 The Hastings Center Rep. 5
(Oct. 1979) (quoting Bristow, Forum on Medicine (June 1979)). Another critic suggests that the
physician is used to replace the "monster-like figure of the executioner" with the "more benign, if no
less deadly, appearance of the medical professional." Finks, Lethal Injection: An Uneasy Alliance of
Law and Medicine, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 383, 383 (1983). One author asserts that Florida psychiatrists
are used as pawns, moved by the political fortunes of the Governor. See The Politics of Death, THE
NATION 636, 637 (Dec. 15, 1984). The author speculates that the finding of incompetency for Alvord
reflects the national political ambitions of the Governor, and his concern about the public perception
of him as a "crackpot zealot" who gets "writer's cramp from signing death warrants." Id. at 637.
81. This Note assumes that it is in the best interest of the patient to both live and be cured.
However, given the contingencies arranged by the state, these outcomes are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, the physician cannot act in the best interests of her patient.
82. Arguably, some inmates may want to die. The implication of medical involvement in "suicide"
or "right to die" cases is beyond the scope of this Note. Unlike these cases, which set medical ethics
against patient autonomy, this Note considers the situation in which the ethics of the physician coin-
cide with the independent will of the inmate to live.
83. See Merskey, Ethical Aspects of the Physical Manipulation of the Brain, in PSYCHIATRIC
ETHICS, supra note 36, at 131. Thus, requiring physicians to participate in the treatment of the
insane condemned in violation of their ethics "would tend to reduce the medical professional to a
skilled tradesman without ultimate normative commitments." Derr, supra note 34, at 30 (arguing that
denial of food or fluids to any patient violates medical ethics). When the state permits or encourages
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A final argument for participation highlights the physician's putative
obligation to perform duties for the state which the state deems legitimate
and necessary. 4 The physician's obligation becomes a duty if the physi-
cian maintains an employment relationship with the state.8 5 This "good
citizen" model of physician compliance with the mandate of the state
proves too much. One can be a good citizen and conscientiously question
the objectives of the state; 8 indeed, one can be a good citizen and refuse to
obey a directive of the state.87 The issue is whether the physician's respon-
sibility to society is best discharged by observing professional standards or
by complying with the dictates of law and custom. 8 Medical experiments
of physicians in Nazi Germany provide a chilling example of the risk
society takes when it encourages doctors to subvert their ethics in the ser-
vice of the state.
this "degradation of the medical profession," id., the results can be tragic for society. The most ex-
treme example is the Nazis, who used physicians as an integral part of their euthanasia program for
thousands of mentally disabled and handicapped patients. Chodoff, The Responsibility of the Psychia-
trist to His Society, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS (S. Bloch & P. Chodoff eds. 1981). During this time,
German physicians may have been the most skilled in the "Western world from a purely technical
point of view . . [but] they had ceased to be members of an ethical profession . . . they dispens[ed]
life and death with equal skill." Derr, supra note 34. Judge Bazelon also notes that the "medical
label 'sick' has been used by Soviet psychiatrists to serve the political purposes of the state." Bazelon,
supra note 53, at 78.
84. Even legitimate duties to third-parties may have an unjustifiable impact on the doctor-patient
relationship. One critic notes that:
[Ilf physicians include benefits to others in their calculations, patients have to be told that their
physicians have conflicting agendas. The Hippocratic Oath would have to be removed from the
waiting room wall and replaced with a sign that says, "Warning all ye who enter here. The
physician will at times abandon your interests in order to benefit others . .. ."
Veatch, Commentary to the HMO Physician's Duty to Cut Costs, 15 Hastings Center Rep. 13, 14
(1985).
85. See supra note 16 (many states require that insane condemned be placed in state mental
hospitals).
86. For example, the right of free speech explicitly encompasses the ability of citizens to express,
without penalty, their displeasure with state action. U.S. Const. Amend. 1. See, e.g., Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (speech clause protects right to express displeasure with draft).
87. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment sup-
ports this view. The Amish may exempt themselves from compulsory education laws. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Jehovah's Witnesses may refuse to salute the flag during the Pledge
of Allegiance. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
The most apt analogy is that of the conscientious objector during the era of the Selective Service.
Persons opposed to war in any form on religious grounds were exempted by statute from military
service. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), Justice Black's plurality opinion held that an
exemption on moral, ethical, or religious principle was sufficient to fall within the statute.
This Note does not propose that the physician's ethical principles should be cognizable as a religion
within the meaning of the First Amendment. It does argue, however, that a deeply held, sincere belief
in these ethical principles has substantial weight and must be carefully considered by the state.
88. Chodoff, supra note 83, at 308 (commenting on responsibilities of citizenship for physicians).
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B. Protecting the Integrity of the Medical Profession
The state has a countervailing and equally compelling interest in pro-
tecting the ethical integrity of physicians. 9 These ethical principles usu-
ally center around the physician's duty to her patient.90 For example,
medical ethics are a factor to be weighed against the right of the patient to
refuse treatment on religious grounds.9' Courts have recognized that pro-
fessional codes of ethics may provide an exception to the employment ter-
mination-at-will doctrine.9 2 Also, the state punishes those who attempt to
subvert medical ethics. 93 The well-established state interest in protecting
the ethical integrity of physicians counters and undermines its interest in
the use of the medical profession in the treatment of the insane
condemned.
C. State Interest in Protecting the Public Health
The state's interest in protecting the public health requires it to ensure
both the availability of competent, ethical physicians, and a population
with sufficient trust in physicians to avail themselves of medical care. One
manifestation of this intent is state authorization of the licensing of physi-
89. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977) (state interest in ensuring ethical integrity of medical profession); In re Con-
roy, 98 N.J. 321, 351-52, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985) (state interest in "safeguarding the integrity of
the medical profession").
90. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351-52, 486 A.2d at 1224; see also United States v. George, 239
F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) (in determining course of treatment, doctor's conscience and
professional oath must be respected); Superintendent of Belchertown State School, 373 Mass. at 741,
370 N.E.2d at 426 (recognizing that prevailing medical ethical standards in determining right to
refuse treatment did not mandate treatment for the terminally ill); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.
v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 583, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (1971) (when interests of hospital physicians were
"pitted against the belief of the patient," court resolved problem by permitting hospital physicians to
pursue treatment "according to their professional standards"). The ethics asserted in competency to be
executed proceedings directly affect the doctor-patient relationship.
91. See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. at 754 (patient cannot dictate course of treat-
ment on religious grounds which would ignore mandates of doctor's professional oath).
92. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980). The Court
stated: "[e]mployees who are professionals owe a special duty to abide not only by . . . law, but also
by the recognized codes of ethics of their professions. That duty may oblige them to decline to perform
acts required by their employers." Id. In Pierce, a physician invoked the Hippocratic Oath as grounds
for refusal to continue her research on a drug containing saccharin. The Court noted that while use of
saccharin was in controversy, her complaint did not allege, nor were facts adduced, that would prove
that the pharmaceutical company would actually test the drug on humans. Therefore, the invocation
of the Oath to "do no harm" was not implicated. Id. at 513-14.
Under the causation model this Note proposes, supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text, the
psychiatrist who treats the insane condemned assists in the execution of her patient, an indisputable
"harm." Hence, were a psychiatrist to refuse to treat an insane prisoner under these circumstances,
she might successfully assert her ethical refusal as a defense to any employment sanction imposed by
the state.
93. Thus, one court has held that as a matter of public policy, the Hippocratic Oath provides
legal protection for communications between doctor and patient, and an insurance company which
interferes with this relationship can be held to respond in damages. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. at 797, 801.
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cians, reflecting state interests in the quality of care and medical services
provided to patients.9 To further this interest, the state must protect both
the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and the public's perception
of the role physicians play in society. Thus, substantial interests militate
against the appearance of medical participation in the death penalty. The
spectre of the physician donning the executioner's hood inspires little con-
fidence among people who receive medical treatment from the same physi-
cian.9 5 Also, sociological studies show that institutional actors internalize
the values of their workplace." For physicians who participate in the
death penalty process, the result may be a diminution of respect for the
sanctity of human life, an attitude which conflicts with the state interest in
the public health.
V. POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS TO THE ETHICAL DILEMMA
By drafting statutes that codify a common law prohibition against exe-
cuting the insane, and by implementing these statutes with a process that
uses psychiatrists, the state has posed an insoluble ethical dilemma for
psychiatrists. Treating a condemned inmate pursuant to these statutes pits
the role of healer, which is the essence of. being a physician, squarely
against the injunctions to do no harm and to take no life.
Although the state has an interest in executing the condemned, state
interests can be asserted both for and against the use of physicians in
treatment. In this case, particularly given the strength and nature of the
interests involved, it is not legitimate for the state to enact statutes that
alternatively invite or, in the case of state employees, coerce the medical
profession to breach its ethics.
The state might have resolved the problem by concluding that the ex-
emption for the insane from execution is a policy that has lost relevance in
the modern world, or is a form of "inverted humanitarianism,'7 and exe-
cute all of the condemned without view to competency.9" For those indi-
94. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-9, -10 (1985) (listing requirements for licensure).
95. Historical perception by the public of the executioner is "hard, uncaring, almost monster-like,
a professional killer whose work is made legal." Finks, supra note 80, at 383. The Human Rights
Advocacy Committee at the Florida State Mental Hospital at Chattahoochee stated their concern:
"[T]reatment of such prisoners [incompetent condemned pursuant to Florida statute] would erode
hospital morale, since some patients would find it difficult to trust staff who someday might recom-
mend another patient's execution." 20 Psychiatric News, supra note 31, at 14-15.
96. See In the Service of the State: The Psychiatrist as Double Agent, 8 Hastings Center Rep. 1,
3-4 (Spec. Supp. Apr. 1978); see also, Bazelon, supra note 53, at 79.
97. "Is it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarous the capital punishment of
those who have become insane after trial and conviction, but accepts the capital punishment of sane
men." Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 159, 208 P.2d 668, 676-77 (1949) (Traynor, J., concurring).
98. Medical ethics would not be violated if the state chose to execute all condemned inmates
without regard to sanity, because the state would execute whether the physician treated or not, and
her intervention would in no way cause the death. This solution is consistent with the argument
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viduals who believe that the execution of the insane is more barbarous or
less meaningful than a normal execution, such a solution would have been
unacceptable. After Ford, it is also clearly unconstitutional. 9
Alternatively, the state could accord the status of a conscientious objec-
tor to state psychiatrists troubled by the prospect of treating these individ-
uals. A legislative exemption would insulate the physician from the retali-
atory and coercive powers of the state.100 One obvious objection is that the
state has not rescued the physician from the dilemma that the state has
created; rather, the state has simply permitted the psychiatrist to choose
without penalty one prong of the conflict. This solution rests on the notion
that statutes which cannot be implemented without causing a profession to
violate its ethics are permissible if the state does not penalize either of the
conflict-laden choices it permits. The propriety of setting up the conflict in
the first place remains problematic. And the state should be aware that by
relying on volunteer physicians to render treatment, it is relying on a
group of physicians who practice near the border of what the profession
has defined as ethical conduct.101
The state could achieve its interest in execution by using other profes-
sions to fulfill the statutory obligation. Nurses, psychologists and social
workers on the staff of state hospitals all are experienced in the care and
treatment of the mentally ill. However, illnesses that rise to the level of
incompetence are usually treated with psychotropic drugs,102 which re-
quire doctors for administration. Further, it is possible that the ethics of
psychologists, social workers, and nurses would also prohibit treatment
under these circumstances.103
Finally, subsequent to a finding of incompetency to be executed, the
state may choose to involve the medical profession in treatment pursuant
to existing statutes. Should the state elect this course, this Note proposes
that it should not do so at the expense of the ethical integrity of the medi-
advanced in this Note, which takes no position with respect to the propriety of the death penalty.
99. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ot. 2595 (1986).
100. Gary Alvord, the condemned inmate currently undergoing treatment pursuant to the Florida
competency statute, has been treated by volunteer staff because of serious questions about the ethics of
treating him that were raised by the hospital staff. See Krasnow, supra note 25, at A-1, col. 6.
101. In this regard, the experience of the state with testimony on future dangerousness is instruc-
tive. The APA has taken the position that psychiatric testimony in capital proceedings on the subject
of future dangerousness is improper. See Barefoot Amicus Brief, supra note 12 (criticizing role of
psychiatrists in these proceedings). The state continues to call for psychiatric testimony, and psychia-
trists step forward to testify. The result, however, is that a small number of psychiatrists who are
willing to testify over the objections of the profession dominate and distort the process. In twenty cases
in which mental health professionals testified on future dangerousness, a total of 29 witnesses testified.
Eight testified once, and two others testified in 12 and 9 cases respectively. Dix, Participation by
Mental Health Professionals in Capital Murder Sentencing, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 283, 291
(1978).
102. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
103. Cf case cited supra note 35 (ethics of nursing profession).
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cal profession. Rather, because treatment by physicians under these cir-
cumstances results in a serious breach of professional ethics, and because
the state has conflicting interests at stake, the state-should defer to medical
ethics. The only way to achieve this accommodation is to specify in ad-
vance that subsequent to a finding of incompetence to be executed, and
prior to treatment by a physican, the sentence of the insane condemned
will be commuted to life imprisonment.""' Because treatment would no
longer be equated with doing harm to the patient and taking life, the
physician could heal the inmate free of ethical betrayal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The states have enacted and implemented competency to be executed
statutes that pose an irreconcilable ethical conflict for the medical profes-
sion. Based on an analysis of the relevant medical ethics and state inter-
ests, this Note contends that the state must accommodate the ethical integ-
rity of the medical profession. 0 5 This proposal is not revolutionary. The
state has traditionally respected and upheld the ethical integrity of various
professions. It must now do so in the context of medical treatment of the
insane condemned, because to do otherwise results in the anathema of
making "one learned profession the very agent of an attack upon the ethi-
cal foundations of another." 06
104. This model accords with the proposal by staff members currently struggling with the ethical
implications of treating the incompetent condemned in Florida. See supra note 73 and accompanying
text. It further accords with the British experience. Although English common law provided that a
condemned prisoner whose sanity was restored could be executed, no persons have actually been exe-
cuted since the early 1840's. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 5, at 38. England currently has no death
penalty.
105. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (against charge of incompetent counsel,
Court recognized defense based on legal ethics and found professional ethic supplants duty of zealous
advocacy). Although the ethics of the legal profession are often codified in statutes and carry the
weight of law, in this case the Court also explicitly alluded to the weight given canons and codes of
professional ethics. Id. at 994-96.
106. Derr, supra note 34, at 30. (referring to legal judgment that would permit physicians to
deny patients food and fluids).
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